CREDIBLE AUCTIONS: A TRILEMMA

被引：45
作者：
Akbarpour, Mohammad [1 ]
Li, Shengwu [2 ]
机构：
[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源：
ECONOMETRICA | 2020年 / 88卷 / 02期
关键词：
Mechanism design; auction; credible; strategy-proof; sealed-bid; IMPERFECT COMMITMENT; REVELATION PRINCIPLE; MECHANISMS; DESIGN; GAMES;
D O I：
10.3982/ECTA15925
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Consider an extensive-form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with bidders. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single bidder detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values. The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism.
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页码：425 / 467
页数：43
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