CREDIBLE AUCTIONS: A TRILEMMA

被引：49

作者：

Akbarpour, Mohammad ^{[1
]}

Li, Shengwu ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[2] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2020年 / 88卷 / 02期

关键词：

Mechanism design; auction; credible; strategy-proof; sealed-bid; IMPERFECT COMMITMENT; REVELATION PRINCIPLE; MECHANISMS; DESIGN; GAMES;

D O I：

10.3982/ECTA15925

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Consider an extensive-form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with bidders. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single bidder detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values. The first-price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism.

引用

页码：425 / 467

页数：43

共 52 条

[1]

AKBARPOUR M, 2020, ECONOMETRICA S, V88, DOI [10.3982/ECTA15925, DOI 10.3982/ECTA15925]

[2] HOW AUCTIONS WORK FOR WINE AND ART [J].

ASHENFELTER, O .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1989, 3 (03) :23-36

[3] COMPARING OPEN AND SEALED BID AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM TIMBER AUCTIONS [J].

Athey, Susan ;

Levin, Jonathan ;

Seira, Enrique .

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2011, 126 (01) :207-257

[4] The theory of implementation when the planner is a player [J].

Baliga, S ;

Corchon, LC ;

Sjostrom, T .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 77 (01) :15-33

[5] Robust mechanism design [J].

Bergemann, D ;

Morris, S .

ECONOMETRICA, 2005, 73 (06) :1771-1813

[6] MENU AUCTIONS, RESOURCE-ALLOCATION, AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE [J].

BERNHEIM, BD ;

WHINSTON, MD .

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1986, 101 (01) :1-31

[7] Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case [J].

Bester, H ;

Strausz, R .

ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2000, 69 (02) :165-171

[8] Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The single agent case [J].

Bester, H ;

Strausz, R .

ECONOMETRICA, 2001, 69 (04) :1077-1098

[9]

Brooks B. A., 2018, WORKING PAPER

[10] Toeholds and takeovers [J].

Bulow, J ;

Huang, M ;

Klemperer, P .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1999, 107 (03) :427-454

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 →