Long-term transmission rights and dynamic efficiency

被引：3

作者：

Petropoulos, Georgios ^{[1
,2
]}

Willems, Bert ^{[3
,4
,5
]}

机构：

[1] MIT Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[2] Bruegel, Brussels, Belgium

[3] Tilburg Univ, Tilec, Tilburg, Netherlands

[4] Tilburg Univ, CentER, Tilburg, Netherlands

[5] Toulouse Sch Econ IDEI, Toulouse, France

来源：

ENERGY ECONOMICS | 2020年 / 88卷

关键词：

Network access; Congestion management; Renewable energy sources; Power markets; ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS; MARKET POWER; ELECTRICITY; CONTRACTS; NETWORKS; MODELS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104714

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We compare market designs for access regulation of a bottleneck transmission line, and study their impact on investment decisions by an incumbent firm with an existing dirty technology and entrant with an uncertain future low-carbon technology. Nodal pricing, which allocates network access on a short-term competitive basis, distorts investment decisions, as the incumbent preempts the entrant by investing early. Long-term tradable transmission rights restore investment efficiency: the incumbent's investment timing becomes socially optimal. This is the case for financial and physical transmission rights, but it requires the existence of a secondary market for transmission rights. (C) 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页数：12