We suggest approximately optimal bidding strategies for games, where similar items are auctioned repeatedly. Considering players' bounded rationality in practice, the results can further motivate the application of market-based approaches in resource allocation problems. We specialize the bidding algorithm for first-price payment schemes, the building blocks of several simplified selling mechanisms, that are common in practice.
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Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY USA
Univ Montreal, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada
CIRANO, Montreal, PQ, Canada
CIREQ, Montreal, PQ, CanadaLERNA INRA, Toulouse Sch Econ, F-31042 Toulouse, France
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Univ Francisco Marroquin, Ctr Vernon Smith Econ Expt, Guatemala City 01010, GuatemalaUniv Francisco Marroquin, Ctr Vernon Smith Econ Expt, Guatemala City 01010, Guatemala
Aycinena, Diego
Baltaduonis, Rimvydas
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Gettysburg Coll, Dept Econ, Gettysburg, PA 17325 USAUniv Francisco Marroquin, Ctr Vernon Smith Econ Expt, Guatemala City 01010, Guatemala
Baltaduonis, Rimvydas
Rentschler, Lucas
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Univ Francisco Marroquin, Ctr Vernon Smith Econ Expt, Guatemala City 01010, GuatemalaUniv Francisco Marroquin, Ctr Vernon Smith Econ Expt, Guatemala City 01010, Guatemala