Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
Danak, Amir [1 ]
Mannor, Shie [2 ]
机构：
[1] McGill Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Dept Elect Engn, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel
来源：
ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2012年 / 196卷 / 01期
关键词：
Mathematical optimization; Approximation methods; Game theory; Bayesian equilibrium; Repeated games; Auctions; Decision-making problems;
D O I：
10.1007/s10479-012-1148-8
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We suggest approximately optimal bidding strategies for games, where similar items are auctioned repeatedly. Considering players' bounded rationality in practice, the results can further motivate the application of market-based approaches in resource allocation problems. We specialize the bidding algorithm for first-price payment schemes, the building blocks of several simplified selling mechanisms, that are common in practice.
引用
收藏
页码：189 / 199
页数：11
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