Corporate complexity, managerial myopia, and hostile takeover exposure: Evidence from textual analysis

被引：22

作者：

Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn ^{[1
]}

Ongsakul, Viput ^{[2
,3
]}

Jiraporn, Pornsit ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Chulalongkorn Univ, Ctr Excellence Management Res Corp Governance & B, Sasin Sch Management, Bangkok, Thailand

[2] Natl Inst Dev Adm NIDA, NIDA Business Sch, Bangkok, Thailand

[3] Secur & Exchange Commiss Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand

[4] Penn State Univ, Sch Grad Profess Studies, Malvern, PA 19355 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL FINANCE | 2022年 / 33卷

关键词：

Complexity; Takeovers; Hostile takeover; Corporate governance; Market for corporate control; QUIET LIFE; SHORT-TERMISM; SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS; ENTRENCHED BOARDS; AGENCY PROBLEMS; STOCK RETURNS; GOVERNANCE; MARKET; COST;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbef.2021.100601

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Exploiting a novel measure of firm complexity based on textual analysis (Loughran and McDonald, 2020), we explore the effect of hostile takeover exposure on firm complexity. Our results demonstrate that more takeover vulnerability leads to less complex firms. Hostile takeover threats diminish managers' job security and thus exacerbates managerial myopia. Short-sighted managers focus on short-term investments at the expense of more complex, long-term, projects, resulting in lower corporate complexity. Our measure of takeover susceptibility is principally based on state legislation, which is plausibly exogenous. Therefore, our results are more likely to reflect causality than merely an association. Further analysis corroborates the results including propensity score matching, entropy balancing, an instrumental-variable analysis, and using Oster's (2017) method for testing coefficient stability. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：12