Network strength games: the core and the nucleolus

被引:2
|
作者
Baiou, Mourad [1 ,2 ]
Barahona, Francisco [3 ]
机构
[1] CNRS, Campus Cezeaux,BP 125, F-63173 Aubiere, France
[2] Univ Clermont II, Campus Cezeaux,BP 125, F-63173 Aubiere, France
[3] IBM TJ Watson Res Ctr, Yorktown Hts, NY 10589 USA
关键词
Network strength game; Strength of a network; Cooperative games; Nucleolus; COMPLEXITY; ALGORITHM;
D O I
10.1007/s10107-018-1348-3
中图分类号
TP31 [计算机软件];
学科分类号
081202 ; 0835 ;
摘要
The maximum number of edge-disjoint spanning trees in a network has been used as a measure of the strength of a network. It gives the number of disjoint ways that the network can be fully connected. This suggests a game theoretic analysis that shows the relative importance of the different links to form a strong network. We introduce the Network strength game as a cooperative game defined on a graph G=(V,E). The player set is the edge-set E and the value of a coalition S subset of Eis the maximum number of disjoint spanning trees included in S. We study the core of this game, and we give a polynomial combinatorial algorithm to compute the nucleolus when the core is non-empty.
引用
收藏
页码:117 / 136
页数:20
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games
    Rodica Brânzei
    Tamás Solymosi
    Stef Tijs
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2005, 33 : 447 - 460
  • [42] A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games
    Driessen, Theo S. H.
    Hou, Dongshuang
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2010, 39 (1-2) : 185 - 189
  • [43] Computing core allocations in cooperative games with an application to cooperative procurement
    Drechsel, J.
    Kimms, A.
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS, 2010, 128 (01) : 310 - 321
  • [44] The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games
    Hokari, T
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2000, 29 (01) : 133 - 137
  • [45] Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games
    Brânzei, R
    Solymosi, T
    Tijs, S
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2005, 33 (03) : 447 - 460
  • [46] A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games
    Theo S. H. Driessen
    Dongshuang Hou
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2010, 39 : 185 - 189
  • [47] Spanning network games
    Granot, D
    Maschler, M
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1998, 27 (04) : 467 - 500
  • [48] Spanning network games
    Daniel Granot
    Michael Maschler
    International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27 : 467 - 500
  • [49] The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the Weber set
    Marieke Quant
    Peter Borm
    Hans Reijnierse
    Bas van Velzen
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2005, 33 : 491 - 503
  • [50] The core of games on ordered structures and graphs
    Grabisch, Michel
    ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2013, 204 (01) : 33 - 64