Network strength games: the core and the nucleolus

被引:2
|
作者
Baiou, Mourad [1 ,2 ]
Barahona, Francisco [3 ]
机构
[1] CNRS, Campus Cezeaux,BP 125, F-63173 Aubiere, France
[2] Univ Clermont II, Campus Cezeaux,BP 125, F-63173 Aubiere, France
[3] IBM TJ Watson Res Ctr, Yorktown Hts, NY 10589 USA
关键词
Network strength game; Strength of a network; Cooperative games; Nucleolus; COMPLEXITY; ALGORITHM;
D O I
10.1007/s10107-018-1348-3
中图分类号
TP31 [计算机软件];
学科分类号
081202 ; 0835 ;
摘要
The maximum number of edge-disjoint spanning trees in a network has been used as a measure of the strength of a network. It gives the number of disjoint ways that the network can be fully connected. This suggests a game theoretic analysis that shows the relative importance of the different links to form a strong network. We introduce the Network strength game as a cooperative game defined on a graph G=(V,E). The player set is the edge-set E and the value of a coalition S subset of Eis the maximum number of disjoint spanning trees included in S. We study the core of this game, and we give a polynomial combinatorial algorithm to compute the nucleolus when the core is non-empty.
引用
收藏
页码:117 / 136
页数:20
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] A note on assignment games with the same nucleolus
    Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz, F.
    Rafels, Carlos
    Ybern, Neus
    TOP, 2019, 27 (02) : 187 - 198
  • [32] Generalized Nucleolus, Kernels, and Bargainig Sets for Cooperative Games with Restricted Cooperation
    Naumova, Natalia
    CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL VIII, 2015, 8 : 231 - 242
  • [33] Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs
    Schulz, Andreas S.
    Uhan, Nelson A.
    DISCRETE OPTIMIZATION, 2013, 10 (02) : 163 - 180
  • [34] A Simple Algorithm for the Nucleolus of Airport Profit Games
    Rodica Brânzei
    Elena Iñarra
    Stef Tijs
    José M. Zarzuelo
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, 34 : 259 - 272
  • [35] The B-nucleolus of TU-games
    Reijnierse, H
    Potters, J
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1998, 24 (1-2) : 77 - 96
  • [36] A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games
    Branzei, Rodica
    Inarra, Elena
    Tijs, Stef
    Zarzuelo, Jose M.
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2006, 34 (02) : 259 - 272
  • [37] Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value
    Trudeau, Christian
    Vidal-Puga, Juan
    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2020, 103 : 8 - 14
  • [38] Bargaining Set, Kernel and Nucleolus for Multi-choice Games with Coalition Structure
    Li, Tianwen
    Ma, Feng
    Liu, Weiyi
    2013 25TH CHINESE CONTROL AND DECISION CONFERENCE (CCDC), 2013, : 1234 - 1239
  • [39] Nucleolus based cost allocation methods for a class of constrained lane covering games
    Oner, Nihat
    Kuyzu, Gultekin
    COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, 2022, 172
  • [40] Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games
    J. Arin
    V. Feltkamp
    Top, 2005, 13 (2) : 331 - 341