Network strength game;
Strength of a network;
Cooperative games;
Nucleolus;
COMPLEXITY;
ALGORITHM;
D O I:
10.1007/s10107-018-1348-3
中图分类号:
TP31 [计算机软件];
学科分类号:
081202 ;
0835 ;
摘要:
The maximum number of edge-disjoint spanning trees in a network has been used as a measure of the strength of a network. It gives the number of disjoint ways that the network can be fully connected. This suggests a game theoretic analysis that shows the relative importance of the different links to form a strong network. We introduce the Network strength game as a cooperative game defined on a graph G=(V,E). The player set is the edge-set E and the value of a coalition S subset of Eis the maximum number of disjoint spanning trees included in S. We study the core of this game, and we give a polynomial combinatorial algorithm to compute the nucleolus when the core is non-empty.
机构:
Corvinus Univ Budapest, Dept Operat Res & Actuarial Sci, Fovam Ter 8, H-1093 Budapest, HungaryCorvinus Univ Budapest, Dept Operat Res & Actuarial Sci, Fovam Ter 8, H-1093 Budapest, Hungary
Solymosi, Tamas
Sziklai, Balazs
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机构:
Corvinus Univ Budapest, Dept Operat Res & Actuarial Sci, Fovam Ter 8, H-1093 Budapest, Hungary
Hungarian Acad Sci, Ctr Econ & Reg Studies, Momentum Game Theory Res Grp, Budaorsi Ut 45, H-1112 Budapest, HungaryCorvinus Univ Budapest, Dept Operat Res & Actuarial Sci, Fovam Ter 8, H-1093 Budapest, Hungary