Network strength games: the core and the nucleolus

被引:2
|
作者
Baiou, Mourad [1 ,2 ]
Barahona, Francisco [3 ]
机构
[1] CNRS, Campus Cezeaux,BP 125, F-63173 Aubiere, France
[2] Univ Clermont II, Campus Cezeaux,BP 125, F-63173 Aubiere, France
[3] IBM TJ Watson Res Ctr, Yorktown Hts, NY 10589 USA
关键词
Network strength game; Strength of a network; Cooperative games; Nucleolus; COMPLEXITY; ALGORITHM;
D O I
10.1007/s10107-018-1348-3
中图分类号
TP31 [计算机软件];
学科分类号
081202 ; 0835 ;
摘要
The maximum number of edge-disjoint spanning trees in a network has been used as a measure of the strength of a network. It gives the number of disjoint ways that the network can be fully connected. This suggests a game theoretic analysis that shows the relative importance of the different links to form a strong network. We introduce the Network strength game as a cooperative game defined on a graph G=(V,E). The player set is the edge-set E and the value of a coalition S subset of Eis the maximum number of disjoint spanning trees included in S. We study the core of this game, and we give a polynomial combinatorial algorithm to compute the nucleolus when the core is non-empty.
引用
收藏
页码:117 / 136
页数:20
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