The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy

被引：84

作者：

Attig, Najah ^{[1
]}

Boubakri, Narjess ^{[2
]}

El Ghoul, Sadok ^{[3
]}

Guedhami, Omrane ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] St Marys Univ, Halifax, NS B3H 3C3, Canada

[2] Amer Univ Sharjah, Sharjah, U Arab Emirates

[3] Univ Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada

[4] Univ S Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 USA

来源：

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2016年 / 45卷 / 02期

关键词：

FREE CASH FLOW; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; AGENCY COSTS; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION; HOLDINGS; DEBT;

D O I：

10.1111/fima.12115

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Using newly collected data on the ultimate ownership structure of publicly traded firms in nine East Asian economies, we find that family control is negatively related to the dividend payout ratio. Family firms are less (more) likely to increase (omit) dividends than non-family firms. These negative associations between family firms and dividend policy are more pronounced during the recent global financial crisis, suggesting that controlling families have incentives to expropriate more firm resources during crises than in normal times.

引用

页码：291 / 313

页数：23

共 51 条

[21] Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings [J].