Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument

被引：0

作者：

Kriegel, U ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Brown Univ, Providence, RI 02912 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：103 / 132

页数：30

共 60 条

[31]

Kriegel U., 2003, PHENOMENOL COGN SCI, V2, P1, DOI DOI 10.1023/A:1022912206810

[32]

Levine Joseph, 2001, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, DOI DOI 10.1093/0195132351.001.0001

[33]

Loar B., 1997, NATURE CONSCIOUSNESS

[34]

Lycan William., 1996, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPERI

[35]

LYCN WG, 1990, PHILOS PERSPECTIVES, V9, P1

[36]

MALCOLM N, 1991, NATURE MIND

[37]

Moran R., 2001, Authority and estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge

[38]

Natsoulas T, 1996, J MIND BEHAV, V17, P267

[39] WHAT IS WRONG WITH APPENDAGE THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS [J].

NATSOULAS, T .

[40]

NATSOULAS T, 1984, PSYCHOANALYSIS CONT, V7, P195