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Institutional Economics and the Cost of Capital for Infrastructure Projects
被引:2
作者:
Geddes, R. Richard
[1
]
Goldman, Joshua
[2
]
机构:
[1] Cornell Univ, Dept Policy Anal & Management PAM, Ithaca, NY 14850 USA
[2] Cornell Univ, Cornell Program Infrastruct Policy, Ithaca, NY USA
关键词:
Cost of capital;
public-private partnerships;
infrastructure;
Arrow-Lind Theorem;
agency problems;
risk sharing;
risk spreading;
corporate governance;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
INVESTMENT DECISION;
DISCLOSURE LEVEL;
MARKET;
UNCERTAINTY;
OWNERSHIP;
FIRM;
D O I:
10.1080/17487870.2020.1768856
中图分类号:
F0 [经济学];
F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理];
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号:
0201 ;
020105 ;
03 ;
0303 ;
摘要:
The growing use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure delivery has rekindled the public versus private cost-of-capital debate. Early debate concluded that the social cost of public-sector capital is below that of private capital because risk can be spread across numerous taxpayers. Intervening research focused on the agency costs that arise due to increased separation between equity holders and managers and the various mechanisms to control those agency costs. We analyze differences in public versus private residual claims and their associated agency costs. We conclude that earlier discussions that omitted agency-cost analysis should be revisited.
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页码:85 / 102
页数:18
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