Position auctions

被引：548

作者：

Varian, Hal R. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2007年 / 25卷 / 06期

关键词：

auctions; online advertising; two-sided matching;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I analyze the equilibria of a game based on the ad auction used by Google and Yahoo. This auction is closely related to the assignment game studied by Shapley-Shubik, Demange-Gale-Sotomayer and Roth-Sotomayer. However, due to the special structure of preferences, the equilibria of the ad auction can. be calculated explicitly and some known results can be sharpened. I provide some empirical evidence that the Nash equilibria of the position auction describe the basic properties of the prices observed in Google's ad auction reasonably accurately. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1163 / 1178

页数：16

共 10 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2005, SEARCH

[2]

BIKHCHANDANI S, 2006, COMBINATORIAL AUCTIO

[3] MULTIITEM AUCTIONS [J].