Corporate tax evasion: The case for specialists

被引：12

作者：

Lipatov, Vilen ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, D-60323 Frankfurt, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2012年 / 81卷 / 01期

关键词：

Tax evasion; Tax avoidance; Tax compliance; Sophisticated evasion; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.015

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyze the role of accounting specialists who help corporations evade/avoid taxes in a game of incomplete information played by a tax authority, corporate taxpayers, and an accounting specialist. In addition to a full equilibrium characterization, we establish that (i) marginal changes in enforcement are not effective when evasion/avoidance is pervasive: (ii) fines on firms as opposed to specialists are more effective in such situations: (iii) reducing auditing costs and increasing "creative accounting" costs are effective in curbing evasion when tax compliance is relatively high. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：185 / 206

页数：22