Optimal capital, regulatory requirements and bank performance in times of crisis: Evidence from France

被引:22
作者
de Bandt, Olivier [1 ]
Camara, Boubacar [1 ]
Maitre, Alexis [2 ]
Pessarossi, Pierre [1 ]
机构
[1] Banque France Autorite Controle Prudentiel & Reso, 66-2770 Direct Etud,61 Rue Taitbout, F-75436 Paris 09, France
[2] Inst Etud Polit Paris, 27 Rue St Guillaume, F-75337 Paris 07, France
关键词
Bank capital; Performance; ROA; Capital requirements; Financial crisis; RISK; DIVERSIFICATION; INTERMEDIATION; INFORMATION; DECISIONS; EARNINGS; BEHAVIOR; DEBT; COST;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfs.2017.03.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The recent implementation of the Basel III framework has re-ignited the debate around the link between actual capital levels, performance and capital requirements in the banking sector. There is a dominant view in the earlier empirical literature in favor of a positive effect of capital on performance. Using panel data gathered by the French supervisor, we also find evidence of this beneficial effect of capital, but try to go one step further by distinguishing between regulatory and voluntary capital. Using a two-step estimation procedure, and controlling for many factors (risk, asset composition, etc.), we show that voluntary capital, i.e. capital held by banks irrespective of their regulatory requirements, turns out to be the sole component of capital that affects performance positively. In contrast, the effect of regulatory capital on profitability appears to be insignificant, indicating that so far the increase in capital requirements has not been detrimental to bank profitability in France. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:175 / 186
页数:12
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