An asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

被引：19

作者：

Dubra, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Montevideo, Montevideo 11600, Uruguay

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 73卷 / 02期

关键词：

cooperative bargaining; symmetry; independence of irrelevant alternatives;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00426-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I define a restricted version of Nash's Independence that overcomes its major criticisms and then show that a one parameter class of asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions is characterized by Restricted Independence, Scale Invariance, Pareto Optimality and Kalai and Smorodinsky's Individual Monotonicity. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：131 / 136

页数：6

共 9 条

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Das Gupta P., 1993, INQUIRY WELL BEING D

[2]

Harsanyi J. C., 1977, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations

[3]

HARSANYI JC, 1972, MANAGE SCI, V18, P80, DOI DOI 10.1287/MNSC.18.5.80

[4] INDIVIDUAL MONOTONICITY AND LEXICOGRAPHIC MAXMIN SOLUTION [J].