Stochastic Dynamic Games in Belief Space

被引:19
|
作者
Schwarting, Wilko [1 ]
Pierson, Alyssa [1 ]
Karaman, Sertac [2 ]
Rus, Daniela [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Comp Sci & Artificial Intelligence Lab CSAIL, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] MIT, Lab Informat Decis Syst LIDS, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
Games; Uncertainty; Robots; Vehicle dynamics; Planning; Nash equilibrium; Approximation algorithms; Game-theoretic planning; motion and path planning; multirobot systems; optimization and optimal control; OPTIMIZATION;
D O I
10.1109/TRO.2021.3075376
中图分类号
TP24 [机器人技术];
学科分类号
080202 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Information gathering while interacting with other agents under sensing and motion uncertainty is critical in domains such as driving, service robots, racing, or surveillance. The interests of agents may be at odds with others, resulting in a stochastic noncooperative dynamic game. Agents must predict others' future actions without communication, incorporate their actions into these predictions, account for uncertainty and noise in information gathering, and consider what information their actions reveal. Our solution uses local iterative dynamic programming in Gaussian belief space to solve a game-theoretic continuous POMDP. Solving a quadratic game in the backward pass of a game-theoretic belief-space variant of iterative linear-quadratic Gaussian control (iLQG) achieves a runtime polynomial in the number of agents and linear in the planning horizon. Our algorithm yields linear feedback policies for our robot, and predicted feedback policies for other agents. We present three applications: Active surveillance, guiding eyes for a blind agent, and autonomous racing. Agents with game-theoretic belief-space planning win 44% more races than without game theory and 34% more than without belief-space planning.
引用
收藏
页码:2157 / 2172
页数:16
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