Path dependence in administrative adjudication: the role played by legal tradition

Based on the theory of path dependence, we show that legal tradition affects the administrative court's rulings. It also complements the two other reasons for diversified verdicts: the experience of the judges and courts (specialization) and preference (bias) for one of the parties. This effect is persistent even if the verdicts are controversial and result in serious consequences for a party and when the penalty paid by the complainant is perceived as excessive but fulfilling the strict rules of law. We prove that judicial decision making is a function of path dependency stemming from a legal tradition of the court. To confirm this, logistic regression is applied to a sample of 337 erroneous excise duty documentation cases of heating oil sales from all sixteen provincial administrative courts in Poland. Increasing the specialization of judges and having them exchange experiences may be a remedy for the unjustified adjudication differences.