Compound voting and the Banzhaf index

被引：21

作者：

Dubey, P

Einy, E

Haimanko, O ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel

[2] SUNY Stony Brook, Ctr Game Theory, Dept Econ, Stony Brook, NY 11794 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2005年 / 51卷 / 01期

关键词：

voting games; Banzhaf power index; compound games; composition axiom;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity requires that no voter has negative power, and at least one has positive power. Transfer requires that, when winning coalitions are enhanced in a game, the change in voting power depends only on the change in the game, i.e., on the set of new winning coalitions. The most crucial axiom is composition: the value of a player in a compound voting game is the product of his power in the relevant first-tier game and the power of his delegate in the second-tier game. We prove that these three axioms categorically determine the Banzhaf index. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：20 / 30

页数：11

共 18 条

[1]

Albizuri M. J., 2001, SPAN ECON REV, V3, P97, DOI DOI 10.1007/PL00013588

[2]

[Anonymous], 1982, GAME THEORY

[3]

Banzhaf J., 1968, VILLANOVA LAW REV, V13, P304

[4] MULTI-MEMBER ELECTORAL DISTRICTS - DO THEY VIOLATE ONE MAN, ONE VOTE PRINCIPLE [J].