Efficient and truthful multi-attribute auctions for crowdsourced delivery

被引:24
作者
Xiao, Fei [1 ]
Wang, Haijun [1 ]
Guo, Shuojia [2 ]
Guan, Xu [1 ]
Liu, Baoshan [3 ]
机构
[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[2] CUNY Coll Staten Isl, Sch Business, Staten Isl, NY 10314 USA
[3] China Univ Geosci, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Crowdsourced delivery; Multi-attribute auction; Mechanism design; Sharing economy; LAST-MILE DELIVERY; E-COMMERCE; CROWD; PROCUREMENT; DESIGN; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108233
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
Crowdsourced delivery is an emerging parcel delivery paradigm that leverages occasional couriers' excess capacities to transport goods. In a crowdsourced delivery system, couriers offer their excess trip capacities to requesters with packages of different weights and distinct valuations for the service. This paper studies the truthful and efficient multi-attribute auction design for the crowdsourced delivery. We develop a second-preferred-score and a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves score (VCG-score) auctions for both single-unit and multi-unit multi-attribute cases, where price and weight are jointly evaluated when assigning package delivery tasks. The proposed auctions lead to truthful private valuation revelation and social welfare maximization. Computational analyses show that our proposed multi-attribute auctions outperform the single-attribute auction and the fixed rate mechanism in maximizing social welfare.
引用
收藏
页数:12
相关论文
共 34 条
  • [1] Building a collaborative solution in dense urban city settings to enhance parcel delivery: An effective crowd model in Paris
    Akeb, Hakim
    Moncef, Btissam
    Durand, Bruno
    [J]. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW, 2018, 119 : 223 - 233
  • [2] The Vehicle Routing Problem with Occasional Drivers
    Archetti, Claudia
    Savelsbergh, Martin
    Speranza, M. Grazia
    [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2016, 254 (02) : 472 - 480
  • [3] Crowdsourced Delivery-A Dynamic Pickup and Delivery Problem with Ad Hoc drivers
    Arslan, Alp M.
    Agatz, Niels
    Kroon, Leo
    Zuidwijk, Rob
    [J]. TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE, 2019, 53 (01) : 222 - 235
  • [4] Properties of scoring auctions
    Asker, John
    Cantillon, Estelle
    [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2008, 39 (01) : 69 - 85
  • [5] A classification framework of multidimensional, multi-unit procurement negotiations
    Bichler, M
    Werthner, H
    [J]. 11TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON DATABASE AND EXPERT SYSTEMS APPLICATION, PROCEEDINGS, 2000, : 1003 - 1009
  • [6] The design of multidimensional auctions
    Branco, F
    [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1997, 28 (01) : 63 - 81
  • [7] DESIGN COMPETITION THROUGH MULTIDIMENSIONAL AUCTIONS
    CHE, YK
    [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1993, 24 (04) : 668 - 680
  • [8] Using the Crowd of Taxis to Last Mile Delivery in E-Commerce: a methodological research
    Chen, Chao
    Pan, Shenle
    [J]. SERVICE ORIENTATION IN HOLONIC AND MULTI-AGENT MANUFACTURING, 2016, 640 : 61 - 70
  • [9] Truthful multi-unit multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain trading
    Cheng, Meng
    Xu, Su Xiu
    Huang, George Q.
    [J]. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW, 2016, 93 : 21 - 37
  • [10] Clarke E. H., 1971, Public choice, P17, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01726210