Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting

被引:49
作者
Cerqueiro, Gerald [1 ]
Degryse, Hans [2 ,4 ]
Ongena, Steven [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Catolica Portuguesa, Sch Econ & Management, P-1699023 Lisbon, Portugal
[2] Tilburg Univ, CentER, TILEC, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[3] CEPR, Dept Finance, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[4] CESifo, Dept Finance, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
Financial intermediation; Loan rates; Price discrimination; Heteroscedastic regression; EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISPERSION; LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; RELATIONSHIP BANKING; SEARCH COSTS; CREDIT; COMPETITION; INFORMATION; DISTANCE; MARKETS; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfi.2010.12.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Loan rates for seemingly identical borrowers often exhibit substantial dispersion. This paper investigates the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted by banks to small and medium sized enterprises. We associate this dispersion with the loan officers' use of "discretion" in the loan rate setting process. We find that "discretion" is most important if: (i) loans are small and unsecured; (ii) firms are small and opaque; (iii) the firm operates in a large and highly concentrated banking market; and (iv) the firm is distantly located from the lender. Consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry, we find a decreasing role for "discretion" over time in the provision of small credits to opaque firms. While widely used in the pricing of loans, "discretion" plays only a minor role in the decisions to grant loans. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:503 / 529
页数:27
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