Welfarism on economic domains

被引：8

作者：

Weymark, JA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ British Columbia, Dept Econ, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 1998年 / 36卷 / 03期

关键词：

Welfarism; social choice; social welfare functionals; restricted domains; economic domains;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00042-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Welfarism is the principle that the relative desirability of social alternatives should, in all circumstances, be determined by a single social ordering of the feasible vectors of utility levels. On an unrestricted domain,it is known that Welfarism and Strong Neutrality are each equivalent to the joint satisfaction of Pareto Indifference and Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. In this article, the validity of this result is investigated for economic domains. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：251 / 268

页数：18

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