THE POST-GREAT WAR SETTLEMENT OF 1919 AND UKRAINE

The aim of the research is to answer the question why the Ukrainian national state did not obtain the international support and assistance after the Great Wan though a national self-determination was one of the guiding principles of the new international settlement. The research methodology is based on the global history approach and a study of primary sources, such as the documents of Paris Peace Conference, a diplomatic correspondence, and the works of the participants and contemporaries of the Conference. The scientific novelty of the article consists in developing and upgrading the previous conclusion concerning the Great Power's position on Ukraine in 1919, based on a set of new available primary sources and the global history approach. The research puts discussions and decisions of Paris Peace Conference on Ukraine into a wider international context and considers the interests of different international actors, not only Ukraine, to avoid a national bias. The Conclusions. The author argues that the Ukrainian nation state did not fit in the Principal Powers' strategic considerations of the post-war period, namely, addressing the Bolshevik westward expansion, restoring Russia's legitimate authority and unity, and a shaping of the European security system. Moreover; after the Bolsheviks' rule was established in the Ukrainian territory of the former Russian Empire, Great Powers did not believe that Ukrainian national institutions were viable. Secondly, the territorial conflicts between the new states, including Poland and Ukraine, demonstrated that the principle of a national self-determination was hardly implemented, and it did not ensure the primary goals of the post-Great War settlement. Though the Principal Powers sought to find a fair solution to the Eastern Galician issue, finally their strategic considerations prevailed over the principle of a national self-determination.