Do market and trust contexts spillover into public goods contributions? Evidence from experimental games in Papua New Guinea

被引:6
作者
Rojas, Cristian [1 ]
Cinner, Joshua [1 ]
机构
[1] James Cook Univ, ARC Ctr Excellence Coral Reef Studies, Townsville, Qld 4811, Australia
基金
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词
Public goods game; Behavioral spillovers; Markets; Trust; ECOSYSTEM SERVICES; PREFERENCES; MANAGEMENT; FAIRNESS; COMANAGEMENT; COOPERATION; COMPETITION; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106661
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
The provision of public goods, such as voluntary enforcement efforts, can be critical to the management of natural resources. However, the degree to which context can influence people's contributions to the public good is poorly understood. Here, we used sequential games in a 'lab in the field' experimental setting with a fishing community in Papua New Guinea to explore whether behavior in two particular contexts-market and trust-spill over public goods' contributions. Behavioral spillovers occur when behavior in one context influences-or is transferred to-behavior in another context. Our results indicate that there is spillover, but surprisingly this occurs from specific roles assumed within the context rather than the broader context itself. The existence of behavioral spillovers into public goods can render conservation initiatives that rely on contributions ineffective, or even damaging if they crowd out intrinsic behavior. Understanding the potential biases different context-e.g. markets created by market-based instruments or trust relied upon by community-based mechanism-can create, is necessary for the implementation of effective and efficient conservation initiatives.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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