The Structure of Health Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

被引:25
作者
Carrera, Mariana [1 ]
Royer, Heather [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Stehr, Mark [5 ]
Sydnor, Justin [3 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Montana State Univ, Dept Agr Econ & Econ, Bozeman, MT 59717 USA
[2] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Econ, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] IZA Inst Lab Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[5] Drexel Univ, LeBow Coll Business, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[6] Univ Wisconsin, Wisconsin Sch Business, Madison, WI 53706 USA
关键词
incentives; health behaviors; field experiment; exercise; wellness program; gym; procrastination; present bias; habit formation; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; HABIT FORMATION; WEIGHT-LOSS; GYM; TAXATION; TRIAL;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2018.3271
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
A growing number of firms use incentive programs to encourage healthy behaviors, but there is little evidence about how such incentives should be structured over time. We explore this issue using a large field experiment that incentivized employees of a Fortune 500 company to use their workplace gym. We compare the effectiveness of a treatment with constant incentives over 8 weeks to two treatments that varied incentives over time. One variable treatment featured front-loaded incentives, which could, in theory, help procrastinators overcome startup costs to joining an incentive program. We find, however, that the front-loaded incentive did not increase participation on the extensive margin relative to the constant incentive and was less effective in sustaining exercise over time. The second variable incentive was designed to leverage short-term habit formation by turning incentives on and off over a longer period of time. This novel sporadic incentive showed slightly stronger effects than the constant incentive. We discuss how the nature of habit-formation processes affects the relative benefits of consistent versus periodic incentives.
引用
收藏
页码:1890 / 1908
页数:19
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