A Pareto-improving Minimum Wage

被引:6
作者
Danziger, Eliav [1 ]
Danziger, Leif [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Simon Fraser Univ, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada
[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
[3] Aarhus Univ, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
[4] CESifo, Munich, Germany
关键词
LABOR-MARKET; MONOPSONISTIC COMPETITION; LEGISLATION; EMPLOYMENT; TAXATION; POLICY; REDISTRIBUTION; CONSEQUENCES; INCOME; LAWS;
D O I
10.1111/ecca.12119
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper shows that a graduated minimum wage, in contrast to a constant minimum wage, can provide a strict Pareto improvement over what can be achieved with an optimal income tax. The reason is that a graduated minimum wage requires high-productivity workers to work more to earn the same income as low-productivity workers, which makes it more difficult for the former to mimic the latter. In effect, a graduated minimum wage allows the low-productivity workers to benefit from second-degree price discrimination, which increases their income.
引用
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页码:236 / 252
页数:17
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