An iterative method for detection of the collusive strategy in prisoner's dilemma game of electricity market

被引:7
作者
Mohtavipour, Seyed Saeid [1 ]
Zideh, Mehdi Jabbari [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Guilan, Dept Elect Engn, Rasht, Iran
关键词
collusive strategy (CS); agent-based simulation; electricity market; game-theory; prisoner's dilemma; AGENT-BASED SIMULATION; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; TACIT COLLUSION; BEHAVIOR; ALGORITHM; POWER;
D O I
10.1002/tee.22804
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
The aim of this article is to present a method, which is called the 'iterative collusive strategy (CS) search method', to detect the CS in prisoner's dilemma game in which there is collusive equilibrium. We apply this method to an example of two-player prisoner's dilemma game and a numerical duopoly example to show its effectiveness. To simulate the electricity market models, we use this method with a local optimization algorithm. Then, we employ a hybrid technique by applying an agent-based model to the iterative CS search method for improving the results and speeding up their convergence. We simulate an electricity market example with transmission constraint to test the effectiveness of local and hybrid iterative CS search methods. Simulation results show that both local and hybrid iterative CS search methods could successfully identify the CS; however, the hybrid iterative CS search method converges to the final results with less iteration numbers. (c) 2018 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:252 / 260
页数:9
相关论文
共 32 条
  • [1] Tuning continual exploration in reinforcement learning: An optimality property of the Boltzmann strategy
    Achbany, Youssef
    Fouss, Francois
    Yen, Luh
    Pirotte, Alain
    Saerens, Marco
    [J]. NEUROCOMPUTING, 2008, 71 (13-15) : 2507 - 2520
  • [2] An agent-based simulation of power generation company behavior in electricity markets under different market-clearing mechanisms
    Aliabadi, Danial Esmaeili
    Kaya, Murat
    Sahin, Guvenc
    [J]. ENERGY POLICY, 2017, 100 : 191 - 205
  • [3] Determining collusion opportunities in deregulated electricity markets
    Aliabadi, Danial Esmaeili
    Kaya, Murat
    Sahin, Guvenc
    [J]. ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS RESEARCH, 2016, 141 : 432 - 441
  • [4] Implicit collusion and individual market power in electricity markets
    Anderson, E. J.
    Cau, T. D. H.
    [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2011, 211 (02) : 403 - 414
  • [5] [Anonymous], 2012, ELEMENTS INFORM THEO
  • [6] Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game
    Brosig, J
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2002, 47 (03) : 275 - 290
  • [7] Can TDH, 2003, IEEE C EVOL COMPUTAT, P2306
  • [8] Centre for Co operation with European Economies in Transition, 1993, GLOSS IND ORG EC COM
  • [9] A Nash equilibrium simulation model for the competitiveness evaluation of the auction based day ahead electricity market
    Dotoli, Mariagrazia
    Epicoco, Nicola
    Falagario, Marco
    Sciancalepore, Fabio
    Costantino, Nicola
    [J]. COMPUTERS IN INDUSTRY, 2014, 65 (04) : 774 - 785
  • [10] Explicit vs. tacit collusion-The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments
    Fonseca, Miguel A.
    Normann, Hans-Theo
    [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2012, 56 (08) : 1759 - 1772