Higher Education Quality Evaluation: A Game-Theory Approach

被引:2
作者
Sun, Fujiang [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Int Relat Beijing, Dept Publ Management, Beijing 100091, Peoples R China
来源
2015 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN MEDICINE AND EDUCATION (ITME) | 2015年
关键词
Education quality evaluation; principal; higher education institution; evaluator; strategy; payoff;
D O I
10.1109/ITME.2015.91
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
This paper looks at the interaction in the process of higher education quality evaluation between the national education authorities, higher education institutions, and evaluators. On the basis of a game model it has established, the paper comes to the conclusion that strategic choices of the higher education institution and the evaluator have a direct effect on each other's payoff and on evaluation of higher education quality, and that the application of supervisory and penal mechanisms can constrain effectively the strategic choices of the higher education institution and the evaluator, thus aligning the interests of the three sides.
引用
收藏
页码:473 / 475
页数:3
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