Governance of electricity transmission systems

被引:7
作者
Boyce, JR [1 ]
Hollis, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calgary, Dept Econ, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada
关键词
transmission; governance; lobbying; non-profit;
D O I
10.1016/j.eneco.2004.12.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines three different governance mechanisms for electricity transmission systems. A regulated transmission company ("Transco") solution suffers from the usual problems of regulatory slack in a natural monopoly. A not-for-profit independent system operator ("NISO") solution solves the regulatory slack problem by being involved in the day-to-day operations; however, the NISO solution suffers from the problem that the NISO directors can become "captured" by industry, leading to inefficient outcomes. In contrast, a for-profit independent system operator ("PISO") solves the regulatory slack problem and is not subject to political pressure from industry. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:237 / 255
页数:19
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