Stable matchings and preferences of couples

被引:69
作者
Klaus, B [1 ]
Klijn, F
机构
[1] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Dept Econ & Hist Econ, E-08193 Barcelona, Spain
[2] CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, E-08193 Barcelona, Spain
关键词
matching; couples; responsiveness; stability;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for "responsive couples markets", viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:75 / 106
页数:32
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