On-demand transparency for improving hardware Trojan detectability
被引:55
作者:
Chakraborty, Rajat Subhra
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机构:
Case Western Reserve Univ, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Cleveland, OH 44106 USACase Western Reserve Univ, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
Chakraborty, Rajat Subhra
[1
]
Paul, Somnath
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h-index: 0
机构:
Case Western Reserve Univ, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Cleveland, OH 44106 USACase Western Reserve Univ, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
Paul, Somnath
[1
]
Bhunia, Swarup
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h-index: 0
机构:
Case Western Reserve Univ, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Cleveland, OH 44106 USACase Western Reserve Univ, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
Bhunia, Swarup
[1
]
机构:
[1] Case Western Reserve Univ, Dept Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
来源:
2008 IEEE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON HARDWARE-ORIENTED SECURITY AND TRUST
|
2008年
关键词:
design obfuscation;
hardware Trojan detection;
trust in IC;
D O I:
10.1109/HST.2008.4559048
中图分类号:
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号:
081202 ;
摘要:
Malevolent Trojan circuits inserted by layout modifications in an IC at untrustworthy fabrication facilities are difficult to detect by traditional post-manufacturing testing. In this paper, we develop a novel low-overhead design methodology that facilitates the detection of inserted Trojan hardware in an IC through logic testing. As a byproduct, it also increases the security of the design by design obfuscation. Application of the proposed design methodology to an 8-bit RISC processor and a JPEG encoder resulted in improvement in Trojan detection probability significantly. It also obfuscated the design with verification mismatch for 90% of the verification points, while incurring moderate area; power and delay overheads.