When 3+1 > 4: Gift Structure and Reciprocity in the Field

被引：35

作者：

Gilchrist, Duncan S. ^{[1
]}

Luca, Michael ^{[2
]}

Malhotra, Deepak ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Wealthfront Inc, Palo Alto, CA 94301 USA

[2] Harvard Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2016年 / 62卷 / 09期

关键词：

economics; behavior and behavioral decision making; microeconomic behavior; labor; IT policy and management; electronic commerce; electronic markets and auctions; organizational studies; motivation-incentives; EXPERIMENTAL LABOR-MARKET; EXCHANGE; FAIRNESS; ECONOMICS; CONTRACTS; TRUST; WORK;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.2015.2275

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Do higher wages elicit reciprocity and lead to increased productivity? In a field experiment with 266 employees, we find that paying higher wages, per se, does not have a discernible effect on productivity in a context with no future employment opportunities. However, structuring a portion of the wage as a clear and unexpected gift-by offering an unconditional raise after the employee has accepted the contract-leads to higher productivity for the duration of the job. Gifts are roughly as efficient as hiring more workers.

引用

页码：2639 / 2650

页数：12

共 30 条

[1] THE FAIR WAGE-EFFORT HYPOTHESIS AND UNEMPLOYMENT [J].