Bureaucrats or politicians? Part 11: Multiple policy tasks

被引:136
作者
Alesina, Alberto [1 ,2 ]
Tabellini, Guido
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
politics; delegation; bureaucracies;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.06.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates first the normative criteria with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non-elected bureaucrats. Politicians are preferable if there is uncertainty about social preferences and flexibility is valuable, or if policy complementarities and compensation of losers is important. Bureaucrats are preferable if time inconsistency and short-termism is an issue, or if vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome. We then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and show that the two generally differ. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:426 / 447
页数:22
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