The Study on the Moral Hazard in the Social Medical Insurance System

被引:0
|
作者
Li Bing-Shui [1 ]
Li Yu-jiao [1 ]
Liu Ying [1 ]
机构
[1] N China Elect Power Univ, Humanities & Social Sci Dept, Baoding, Heibei, Peoples R China
来源
2010 CONFERENCE ON LABOR SCIENCE AND ACTUARIAL SCIENCE, LSAS 2010 | 2010年
关键词
Social medical insurance; Moral hazard; Supply side; Demand side;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In recent years, the problem that the medical expense increases rapidly has become a kind of universal phenomenon in the world. So how to control the medical expense and conduct the reform of medical insurance system is a worldwide difficulty. Moral hazard in the medical insurance is an important reason for leading to medical expense increasing. So the article analyzes the condition of moral hazard and its influences in detail and comes up with a lot of suggestions about relevant measures based on conclusion explains. The aim of the article is to avoid producing moral hazard, shrink the range of its influence and build and perfect the social medical security system. From a lot of data and analyses, it can be concluded that the appearance of moral hazard in the medical insurance system is due to the defect of system. So designing a rational and effective medical insurance system is essential.
引用
收藏
页码:37 / 39
页数:3
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