A Sharing Platform for Multi-Tenant PONs

被引:17
作者
Afraz, Nima [1 ]
Ruffini, Marco [1 ]
机构
[1] Trinity Coll Dublin, CONNECT Ctr Future Networks & Commun, Dublin 2, Ireland
基金
爱尔兰科学基金会;
关键词
Auction; infrastructure sharing; network sharing; PON; AUCTION; ALLOCATION;
D O I
10.1109/JLT.2018.2875188
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
In this paper, we address the sharing incentive issue in multi-tenant passive optical networks (PONs). We propose an economic-robust and efficient sharing platform for new emerging multi-tenant PON networks. This platform is capable of accommodating a diverse range of service providers and enhancing the network utilization. We propose a sharing platform that provides sharing incentives for the incumbent network operators through monetization of inter-operator network sharing. Meanwhile, the platform allows the incumbent operators to operate a virtual instance of the bandwidth scheduling algorithm that enables them to meet their quality of service and latency requirements. Therefore, the proposed sharing platform grants a high degree of control to the operators co-operating the same network while, thanks to the higher resource efficiency, reduces the initial investment. We first model the multi-tenant PON as a market and define the roles of the virtual network operators and the infrastructure provider along with their utility functions. We propose a double auction mechanism to facilitate the trading of excess resources. The proposed double auction satisfies the crucial economic properties of a market while it achieves more efficient resource allocation among the market players. We have theoretically proven the economic robustness of the mechanism including incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and weak budget balance. Through extensive market simulations, we confirmed that the proposed mechanism achieves superior allocative efficiency compared to a reference baseline mechanism.
引用
收藏
页码:5413 / 5423
页数:11
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