How optimal nonlinear income taxes change when the distribution of the population changes

被引:9
作者
Brett, Craig [2 ]
Weymark, John A. [1 ]
机构
[1] Vanderbilt Univ, Dept Econ, Stn B, Nashville, TN 37235 USA
[2] Mt Allison Univ, Dept Econ, Sackville, NB E4L 1A7, Canada
关键词
Asymmetric information; Comparative statics; Optimal income taxation; FINITE ECONOMY; TAXATION; EXPLORATION; PROVISION; MONOPOLY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated. In one version, preferences are quasilinear in leisure. For this version, it is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of,change in everyone's optimal consumptions and optimal marginal tax rates. In the other version, preferences are quasilinear in consumption. For this version, it is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone's optimal before-tax incomes and optimal marginal tax rates. Moreover, the directions of change in the optimal marginal tax rates are the same for the two specifications of preferences. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1239 / 1247
页数:9
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