Nudging the poor and the rich - A field study on the distributional effects of green electricity defaults

被引:33
作者
Ghesla, Claus [1 ]
Grieder, Manuel [2 ,3 ]
Schubert, Renate [2 ]
机构
[1] Poyry Management Consulting GmbH, Kranichberggasse 2, A-1120 Vienna, Austria
[2] Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Dept Humanities Social & Polit Sci, Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Chair Econ, Clausiusstr 37, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Zurich Univ Appl Sci ZHAW, Ctr Energy & Environm, Sch Management & Law, Bahnhofpl 12, CH-8400 Winterthur, Switzerland
关键词
Choice defaults; Welfare; Green electricity; Public policy; Nudging; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; HYPOTHETICAL BIAS; WELFARE ECONOMICS; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; SOCIAL COST; NUDGES; REMINDERS; CHOICES; DESIGN; CHOOSE;
D O I
10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104616
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Choice defaults are an increasingly popular public policy tool. Yet there is little knowledge of the distributional consequences of such nudges for different groups in society. We report results from an elicitation study in the residential electricity market in Switzerland in which we contrast consumers' actual contract choices under an existing default regime with the same consumers' active choices in a survey presenting the same choice-set without any default. We find that the default is successful at curbing greenhouse gas emissions, but it leads poorer households to pay more for their electricity consumption than they would want to, while leaving a significant willingness to pay for green electricity by richer households untapped. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页数:15
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