Institutional preferences, demand shocks and the distress anomaly

被引:6
作者
Ye, Qing [1 ]
Wu, Yuliang [2 ]
Liu, Jia [3 ]
机构
[1] Xian Jiaotong Liverpool Univ, Int Business Sch Suzhou, Xian, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Bradford, Sch Management, Bradford, W Yorkshire, England
[3] Univ Salford, Salford Business Sch, Salford, Lancs, England
关键词
Institutional investors; Institutional preferences; Distress; The chinese stock markets; CROSS-SECTION; FINANCIAL RATIOS; STOCK RETURNS; RISK; INVESTORS; EQUITY; PERFORMANCE; PREDICTION; BANKRUPTCY;
D O I
10.1016/j.bar.2018.04.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Our paper examines the distress anomaly on the Chinese stock markets. We show that the anomaly disappears after controlling for institutional ownership. We propose two hypotheses. The growing scale of institutional investors and changes in institutional preferences can generate greater demand shocks for stocks with low distress risk than those with high distress risk, causing the former to outperform the latter. Consistent with our hypotheses, the growth of institutions explains the anomaly when the institutional market share increases rapidly. We also show that institutional preferences for stocks with low distress risk have significantly increased over time and changes in preferences also explain the anomaly. Finally, momentum trading and gradual incorporation of distress information cannot account for the anomaly.
引用
收藏
页码:72 / 91
页数:20
相关论文
共 50 条
[31]   Book-to-market equity, distress risk, and stock returns [J].
Griffin, JM ;
Lemmon, ML .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2002, 57 (05) :2317-2336
[32]   The dynamics of institutional and individual trading [J].
Griffin, JM ;
Harris, JH ;
Topaloglu, S .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (06) :2285-2320
[33]   MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE - AN ANALYSIS OF QUARTERLY PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS [J].
GRINBLATT, M ;
TITMAN, S .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 1989, 62 (03) :393-416
[34]   EVIDENCE OF PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR OF SECURITY RETURNS [J].
JEGADEESH, N .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1990, 45 (03) :881-898
[35]   Who Gambles in the Stock Market? [J].
Kumar, Alok .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2009, 64 (04) :1889-1933
[36]   Investor protection and corporate governance [J].
La Porta, R ;
Lopez-De-Silanes, F ;
Shleifer, A ;
Vishny, R .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2000, 58 (1-2) :3-27
[37]   Legal determinants of external finance [J].
LaPorta, R ;
LopezDeSilanes, F ;
Shleifer, A ;
Vishny, RM .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1997, 52 (03) :1131-1150
[38]   FADS, MARTINGALES, AND MARKET-EFFICIENCY [J].
LEHMANN, BN .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 105 (01) :1-28
[39]   Privatization and Risk Sharing: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China [J].
Li, Kai ;
Wang, Tan ;
Cheung, Yan-Leung ;
Jiang, Ping .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2011, 24 (07) :2499-2525
[40]   PORTFOLIO SELECTION [J].
Markowitz, Harry .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1952, 7 (01) :77-91