Managing expectations: How selective information affects cooperation and punishment in social dilemma games

Information has a long history of being used with the intention to influence people's be-havior, particularly in situations where people are likely to condition their own behavior on what they expect most others to do. We experimentally study how selective (favorable or unfavorable) information about past cooperativeness of unrelated groups affects cooper-ation in problems of collective action. We find cooperation to crucially depend on pre-play information, coinciding with a change in initial beliefs. In addition, we find unfavorable information to substantially reduce the effectiveness of peer punishment. This prevents groups that start off on the wrong foot from recovering over time. The impact of infor-mation does not rely on information being public or private. Yet it critically relies on the information being surprising. In a cooperative environment, it is unfavorable information that matters; in an uncooperative environment, it is favorable information. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.