Does legality matter? The case of tax avoidance and evasion

被引:18
作者
Blaufus, Kay [1 ]
Hundsdoerfer, Jochen [2 ]
Jacob, Martin [3 ]
Suenwoldt, Matthias [2 ]
机构
[1] Leibniz Univ Hannover, Hannover, Germany
[2] Free Univ Berlin, Garystr 21, D-14195 Berlin, Germany
[3] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Vallendar, Germany
关键词
Expressive law; Legality; Moral appeals; Tax avoidance; Tax evasion; Crowding out; RELATIVE RISK-AVERSION; DETERMINANTS; PEOPLE; DECISIONS; ECONOMICS; AUDIT; COSTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Previous research argues that the law expresses social values and could, therefore, influence individual behavior independently of enforcement and penalization. Using three laboratory experiments on tax avoidance and evasion, we study how legality affects individuals' decisions. We find that, without any risk of negative financial consequences, the qualification of tax minimization as illegal versus legal reduces tax minimization considerably. Legislators can thus, in principle, affect subjects' decisions by defining the line between legality and illegality. However, once we introduce potential negative financial consequences, we observe no difference between legal and illegal tax minimization behavior. Only if we use moral priming to increase subjects' moral cost do we again find a legality effect on tax minimization. Overall, this demonstrates the limitations of the expressive function of the law. Legality might be an important determinant of behavior only if we consider activities with little or no risk of negative financial consequences or if subjects are morally primed. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:182 / 206
页数:25
相关论文
共 59 条
[1]   Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment [J].
Abbink, Klaus ;
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike .
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 9 (02) :103-121
[2]   Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in Europe [J].
Alm, J ;
Torgler, B .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 2006, 27 (02) :224-246
[3]   COMPLIANCE COSTS AND THE TAX AVOIDANCE TAX EVASION DECISION [J].
ALM, J .
PUBLIC FINANCE QUARTERLY, 1988, 16 (01) :31-66
[4]   WHY DO PEOPLE PAY TAXES [J].
ALM, J ;
MCCLELLAND, GH ;
SCHULZE, WD .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1992, 48 (01) :21-38
[5]  
ALM J, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P237
[6]   TESTING BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC ECONOMICS THEORIES IN THE LABORATORY [J].
Alm, James .
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL, 2010, 63 (04) :635-658
[7]  
[Anonymous], 2007, LAW POLICY, DOI DOI 10.1111/J.1467-9930.2007.00248.X
[8]  
[Anonymous], AM EC J EC POLICY
[9]  
[Anonymous], 2012, 1225 CHIC BOOTH U CH
[10]  
Beck P., 1996, Contemporary Accounting Research, V13, P49, DOI DOI 10.1111/CARE.1996.13.ISSUE-1