Universality of weak selection

被引:145
作者
Wu, Bin [1 ,2 ]
Altrock, Philipp M. [1 ]
Wang, Long [2 ]
Traulsen, Arne [1 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Res Grp Evolutionary Theory, D-24306 Plon, Germany
[2] Peking Univ, Coll Engn, State Key Lab Turbulence & Complex Syst, Ctr Syst & Control, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGIES; COOPERATION; GAME; FIXATION; DYNAMICS; STABILITY; EMERGENCE; RULES;
D O I
10.1103/PhysRevE.82.046106
中图分类号
O35 [流体力学]; O53 [等离子体物理学];
学科分类号
070204 ; 080103 ; 080704 ;
摘要
Weak selection, which means a phenotype is slightly advantageous over another, is an important limiting case in evolutionary biology. Recently, it has been introduced into evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary game dynamics, the probability to be imitated or to reproduce depends on the performance in a game. The influence of the game on the stochastic dynamics in finite populations is governed by the intensity of selection. In many models of both unstructured and structured populations, a key assumption allowing analytical calculations is weak selection, which means that all individuals perform approximately equally well. In the weak selection limit many different microscopic evolutionary models have the same or similar properties. How universal is weak selection for those microscopic evolutionary processes? We answer this question by investigating the fixation probability and the average fixation time not only up to linear but also up to higher orders in selection intensity. We find universal higher order expansions, which allow a rescaling of the selection intensity. With this, we can identify specific models which violate (linear) weak selection results, such as the one-third rule of coordination games in finite but large populations.
引用
收藏
页数:11
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