Currency hedging and corporate governance: A cross-country analysis

被引:67
作者
Lel, Ugur [1 ]
机构
[1] Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24060 USA
关键词
Derivatives; Corporate governance; Hedging; International finance; EXCHANGE-RATE EXPOSURE; RISK-MANAGEMENT; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; AGENCY COSTS; INVESTOR PROTECTION; INTERACTION TERMS; PRIVATE BENEFITS; FINANCIAL RISK; FIRMS HEDGE; DERIVATIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.12.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the impact of the strength of governance on firms use of currency derivatives. Using a sample of firms from 30 countries over the period 1990 to 1999, we find that strongly governed firms tend to use derivatives to hedge currency exposure and overcome costly external financing. On the other hand, weakly governed firms appear to use derivatives mostly for managerial reasons. These results are robust to alternative measures of corporate governance, various subsamples, the use of foreign denominated debt as an alternative strategy to hedge currency exposure, and a potential selection bias. Overall, the results serve as the first comprehensive evidence of the impact of firm- and country-level corporate governance on firms' use of derivatives. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 237
页数:17
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