Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

被引:14
作者
Forges, F
Heifetz, A
Minelli, E [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cergy Pontoise, THEMA, Paris, France
[2] Inst Univ France, Paris, France
[3] Univ Brescia, Dipartimento Sci Econ, I-25122 Brescia, Italy
关键词
incentive compatibility; general equilibrium; core;
D O I
10.1007/PL00004188
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.
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页码:349 / 365
页数:17
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