Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility

被引:12
作者
Fuchs, William [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVES; PRINCIPAL; CONTRACTS; FIRMS;
D O I
10.1257/mic.20130250
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good matches are less inclined to accept outside offers.
引用
收藏
页码:99 / 108
页数:10
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