Why performance-based contracting failed in Uganda - An "open-box" evaluation of a complex health system intervention

被引:90
作者
Ssengooba, Freddie [1 ,2 ]
McPake, Barbara [3 ]
Palmer, Natasha [2 ]
机构
[1] Makerere Univ, Sch Publ Hlth, Dept Hlth Policy Planning & Management, Kampala, Uganda
[2] Univ London London Sch Hyg & Trop Med, Dept Global Hlth & Dev, London WC1E 7HT, England
[3] Queen Margaret Univ, Inst Int Hlth & Dev, Musselburgh EH21 6UU, Scotland
关键词
Performance-based contracting; Health program evaluation; Health system; Case study; Uganda; CARE; IMPROVEMENT; MANAGEMENT; SERVICES; CENTERS; PAYMENT; AGENCY; PAY;
D O I
10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.02.050
中图分类号
R1 [预防医学、卫生学];
学科分类号
1004 ; 120402 ;
摘要
Performance-based contracting (PBC) is a tool that links rewards to attainment of measurable performance targets. Significant problems remain in the methods used to evaluate this tool. The primary focus of evaluations on the effects of PBC (black-box) and less attention to how these effects arise (open-box) generates suboptimal policy learning. A black-box impact evaluation of PBC pilot by the Development Research Group of the World Bank (DRG) and the Ministry of Health (MOH) concluded that PBC was ineffective. This paper reports a theory-based case study intended to clarify how and why PBC failed to achieve its objectives. To explain the observed PBC implementation and responses of participants, this case study employed two related theories i.e. complex adaptive system and expectancy theory respectively. A prospective study trailed the implementation of PBC (2003-2006) while collecting experiences of participants at district and hospital levels. Significant problems were encountered in the implementation of PBC that reflected its inadequate design. As problems were encountered, hasty adaptations resulted in a de facto intervention distinct from the one implied at the design stage. For example, inadequate time was allowed for the selection of service targets by the health centres yet they got 'locked-in' to these poor choices. The learning curve and workload among performance auditors weakened the validity of audit results. Above all, financial shortfalls led to delays, short-cuts and uncertainty about the size and payment of bonuses. The lesson for those intending to implement similar interventions is that PBC should not be attempted 'on the cheap'. It requires a plan to boost local institutional and technical capacities of implementers. It also requires careful consideration of the responses of multiple actors both insiders and outsiders to the intended change process. Given the costs and complexity of PBC implementation, strengthening conventional approaches that are better attuned to low income contexts (financing resource inputs and systems management) remains a viable policy option towards improving health service delivery. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:377 / 383
页数:7
相关论文
共 38 条
  • [1] Transdisciplinarity as an Inference Technique to Achieve a Better Understanding in the Health and Environmental Sciences
    Annerstedt, Matilda
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 2010, 7 (06) : 2692 - 2707
  • [2] Unpacking Black Boxes: Mechanisms and Theory Building in Evaluation
    Astbury, Brad
    Leeuw, Frans L.
    [J]. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF EVALUATION, 2010, 31 (03) : 363 - 381
  • [3] Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation
    Basinga, Paulin
    Gertler, Paul J.
    Binagwaho, Agnes
    Soucat, Agnes L. B.
    Sturdy, Jennifer
    Vermeersch, Christel M. J.
    [J]. LANCET, 2011, 377 (9775) : 1421 - 1428
  • [4] Incentive implementation in physician practices: A qualitative study of practice executive perspectives on pay for performance
    Bokhour, BG
    Burgess, JF
    Hook, JM
    White, B
    Berlowitz, D
    Guldin, MR
    Meterko, M
    Young, GJ
    [J]. MEDICAL CARE RESEARCH AND REVIEW, 2006, 63 (01) : 73S - 95S
  • [5] The cultural adaptation of prevention interventions: Resolving tensions between fidelity and fit
    Castro, FG
    Barrera, M
    Martinez, CR
    [J]. PREVENTION SCIENCE, 2004, 5 (01) : 41 - 45
  • [6] Conservatives.com, 2011, 11 CONS
  • [7] DeSavigny D, 2009, SYSTEMS THINKING FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS STRENGTHENING, P1
  • [8] Eichler R., 2009, PERFORMANCE INCENTIV
  • [9] Performance-based payment: some reflections on the discourse, evidence and unanswered questions
    Eldridge, Cynthia
    Palmer, Natasha
    [J]. HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING, 2009, 24 (03) : 160 - 166
  • [10] Evaluating the performance of pay for performance
    Galvin, RS
    [J]. MEDICAL CARE RESEARCH AND REVIEW, 2006, 63 (01) : 126S - 130S