Information asymmetry and the wealth appropriation effect in the bond market: Evidence from late disclosures

被引:12
作者
Khalil, Samer [1 ]
Mansi, Sattar [2 ]
Mazboudi, Mohamad [1 ]
Zhang, Andrew [3 ]
机构
[1] Amer Univ Beirut, Olayan Sch Business, Bliss St, Beirut, Lebanon
[2] Virginia Tech, Pamplin Coll Business, Blacksburg, VA 24060 USA
[3] Univ Nevada, Lee Sch Business, Las Vegas, NV 89154 USA
关键词
Information asymmetry; Late disclosures; Bond market; Debt market; Wealth appropriation; Bond covenants; FORM; 10-K; DEBT; EARNINGS; COST; ANNOUNCEMENTS; REPURCHASES; OWNERSHIP; COVENANTS; CHOICE; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.09.022
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine the effect of an exogenous increase in information asymmetry (as proxied by late filings of firms' Form 10-K) on bond prices. We find that bondholders react negatively to a late filing announcement but this negative reaction is conditional on whether late filing firms appropriate wealth from bondholders through shareholder distribution. Moreover, we find that the impact of financial distress and covenants on bond values is mainly driven by the wealth appropriation from bondholders. The results are robust to difference-in-difference analysis using treatment (i.e., late filing) and control (i.e., non-late-filing) samples based on propensity score matching. The results provide evidence that shareholder distribution as a specific form of wealth appropriation from bondholders to shareholders has a significant effect on bond values when financial information is not timely provided to capital markets.
引用
收藏
页码:49 / 61
页数:13
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