INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE;
SHARE REPURCHASES;
AGENCY COSTS;
LAW;
COMPETITION;
INVESTMENT;
MATTERS;
D O I:
10.1111/jfir.12159
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We address the mixed empirical findings on how corporate governance affects dividend payout policy by analyzing a large sample of firms from 30 countries. Our results indicate that firms with better firm-level governance pay more dividends, even after controlling for country-level governance. However, this relation is pronounced only in countries with low shareholder rights. In addition, we find that when the shareholder rights index is high, firm-level governance is unrelated to dividend payout in the full sample period. Finally, we show that in high-shareholder-rights countries, firm-level governance changes its role from before to after the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
机构:Univ Utah, Karl V Lins David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
Kalcheva, Ivalina
Lins, Karl V.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Utah, Karl V Lins David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USAUniv Utah, Karl V Lins David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
机构:Univ Utah, Karl V Lins David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
Kalcheva, Ivalina
Lins, Karl V.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Utah, Karl V Lins David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USAUniv Utah, Karl V Lins David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA