Powerful CEOs and Corporate Governance

被引：7

作者：

Humphery-Jenner, Mark ^{[1
]}

Islam, Emdad ^{[2
]}

Rahman, Lubna ^{[2
]}

Suchard, Jo-Ann ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNSW Sydney, Sch Banking & Finance, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia

[2] Monash Univ, Sch Banking & Finance, Melbourne, Vic, Australia

来源：

JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES | 2022年 / 19卷 / 01期

基金：

澳大利亚研究理事会;

关键词：

Board Independence; CEO Power; Corporate Governance; Innovation; Powerful CEOs; SOX; Sarbanes-Oxley Act; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; AGENCY COSTS; DIRECTORS; MANAGEMENT; OVERCONFIDENCE; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVES; INNOVATION; OWNERSHIP;

D O I：

10.1111/jels.12305

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

Excessive CEO power is often regarded as value-destroying. We use a quasi-exogenous regulatory shock to analyze whether improved governance helps to channel firms with powerful CEOs toward more value-enhancing corporate policies. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules and focus on firms that were required to improve governance. We find that postregulation firms led by powerful CEOs increase innovation inputs (Research and Development expenditures) and produce more innovation outputs (patents) that are scientifically more important (citations) and economically more valuable (market value of patents). Investment quality also improves, manifesting in better takeover performance and improvements in firm performance and corporate value. Our results suggest that improved governance can mitigate value destruction in powerful CEO-managed firms. We take steps to mitigate econometric concerns and ensure our results are robust to various combinations of fixed effects and control variables.

引用

页码：135 / 188

页数：54

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