Short Selling and Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment

被引：266

作者：

Fang, Vivian W. ^{[1
]}

Huang, Allen H. ^{[2
]}

Karpoff, Jonathan M. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA

[2] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[3] Univ Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2016年 / 71卷 / 03期

关键词：

SHORT-SALES CONSTRAINTS; SHORT SELLERS; PRICE DISCOVERY; MARKET QUALITY; PERFORMANCE; FUTURE; MANIPULATION; BEHAVIOR; COMPENSATION; ASYMMETRY;

D O I：

10.1111/jofi.12369

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

During 2005 to 2007, the SEC ordered a pilot program in which one-third of the Russell 3000 index were arbitrarily chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from shortsale price tests. Pilot firms' discretionary accruals and likelihood of marginally beating earnings targets decrease during this period, and revert to pre-experiment levelswhen the program ends. After the program starts, pilot firms are more likely to be caught for fraud initiated before the program, and their stock returns better incorporate earnings information. These results indicate that short selling, or its prospect, curbs earnings management, helps detect fraud, and improves price efficiency.

引用

页码：1251 / 1294

页数：44

共 75 条

[21] The price response to S&P 500 index additions and deletions:: Evidence of asymmetry and a new explanation [J].