CEO inside debt and the acquisition of private targets

被引:10
作者
Bhabra, Gurmeet S. [1 ]
Bhabra, Harjeet S. [2 ]
Hossain, Ashrafee T. [3 ]
机构
[1] Griffith Univ, Dept Accounting Finance & Econ, Brisbane, Qld, Australia
[2] St Marys Univ, Sobey Sch Business, Halifax, NS, Canada
[3] Mem Univ Newfoundland, Fac Business Adm, St John, NF, Canada
关键词
Inside debt; Deferred compensation; Private targets; Executive compensation; CEO risk preference; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; UNOBSERVED VARIABLES; AGENCY COSTS; CASH FLOW; CORPORATE; RISK; FIRM; INVESTMENT; TAKEOVERS;
D O I
10.1111/acfi.12857
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find a strong positive association between the inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) of CEOs and announcement-period abnormal returns (CARs) of acquiring firms bidding for private targets. In addition, gains to acquirers with high inside debt persist for at least 3 years post-acquisition. Further analyses suggest that our results are largely driven by firms with lower levels of manager-shareholder agency conflicts as proxied by higher transparency in firm activities, presence of a less powerful CEO, or presence of stronger monitoring. Our results are robust to an array of sensitivity tests.
引用
收藏
页码:2163 / 2202
页数:40
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