Epistemic analyticity: A defense

被引:34
作者
Boghossian, PA [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, New York, NY USA
来源
FIFTY YEARS OF QUINE'S TWO DOGMAS | 2003年 / 66卷
关键词
D O I
10.1163/18756735-90000810
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The paper is a defense of the project of explaining the a priori via the notion of meaning or concept possession. It responds to certain objections that have been made to this project-in particular, that there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement. The paper goes on to distinguish between two different ways in which facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement-inferential and constitutive. It concludes by outlining a theory of the latter.
引用
收藏
页码:15 / 35
页数:21
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